Abstract: Supply chains (SC) can be viewed as complex interconnected systems that play a vital role of the transportation and delivery of goods and services. SC usually involves various critical infrastructures, mainly in the transportation sector and exhibit intra-sector and cross-border dependencies with various business entities. Although efforts have been made to standardise supply chain risk assessment (SCRA) approaches, there is a lack of targeted methodologies. In our previous work (Polemi and Kotzanikolaou, 2015) we have proposed a preliminary version of the Medusa SCRA methodology, compliant with ISO28001. The primary goal of Medusa is to assess the risks of an SC rising from the interconnections and interdependencies between the various entities within it. In this paper, we significantly extend our previous work, in order to define all specific details of the Medusa SC RA, such as estimations of threat levels, consequences, risk scales, cascading risks; generation of a baseline SC security policy and identification of security controls. Furthermore, we validate our methodology based on real case scenarios, derived from the pilot operations of the Medusa project and we provide implementation details of the Medusa collaborative system which hosts the methodology and offers SC RA services to the involved BPs.
Introduction
For over a decade significant research efforts have been made towards risk assessment methodologies especially suited to critical infrastructures (CIs). In principle, most of the risk assessment methodologies focus on the identification of threats, vulnerabilities and the related impact and ultimately on the evaluation of the underlying risks. However, most risk assessment methodologies are organisation-oriented and do not consider the cascading effects occurring from cross-sectoral and/or cross-border dependencies. As a consequence, they tend to focus on organisation-wide risks and they fail to capture the security needs of more complex eco-systems of interdependent organisations. Supply chains (SC) are instances of complex, inter-dependent eco-systems. SC security management involves the assessment of security risks deriving from interdependent CIs and various business entities (e.g., companies, ministries, organisations) from various sectors.
According to the ISO 28001 standard (ISO, 2007) on security management systems for the SC, a SC is the set of resources and processes which begins with the provision of raw materials and extends through the delivery of products or services to the customer through the different transport means. Obviously, there is a need for extending and validating existing risk assessment frameworks in terms of their ability to deal with SC risk assessment, including the dependencies associated with the provisioning of the supply chain services (SCS). A starting point for modelling cascading effects lies in the understanding of the interdependencies of the various infrastructures (Pederson et al., 2006; Rinaldi et al., 2001 ) which include physical, cyber, geographic and other (logical dependencies).
Contribution
In this paper, we extend our previous work (Polemi and Kotzanikolaou, 2015) and we present in detail, the Medusa supply chain risk assessment (SCRA) methodology and the collaborative system that implements it in terms of SCRA services. Medusa can be applied to assess the overall risk of a SC, as well as the risk associate with each individual business partner (BP) within a SC. Emphasis has been given in ensuring the compliance with relative security standards (ISO, 2011 (ISO, , 2007 (ISO, , 2013 . The derived overall risk values are used in order to generate a baseline SC security policy, identifying the least necessary security controls for each participant in the SC. In addition, Medusa allows the risk assessor to assess the risk of cascading threat scenarios which may be realised within a SC. The study of the cascading scenarios takes into consideration the graph relations of a potential source of a threat as well as the business role of each participant by utilising weights of business importance. Medusa enables all the SC participants to fine-tune their security policies according to their business role in the examined SC. In order to validate our methodology, we present case studies based on real-world scenarios and data.
Paper structure
This paper is organised as follows; in Section 2, existing risk assessment methodologies are overviewed from the scope of their appropriateness in addressing SC security needs. Section 3 introduces the main concepts and building blocks utilised by the Medusa SC risk assessment methodology, while Section 4 presents in detail all the steps of the methodology. Section 5 briefly describes the architecture of the Medusa system. Section 6 provides validation results of the methodology, based on pilot tests performed on real-case scenarios. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
Research efforts towards SCRA methodologies
Risk management international standards range from general considerations and guidelines for risk management processes (e.g., ISO, 2009a ISO, , 2009b , to specific guidelines for the IT sector (e.g., ISO, 2013 ISO, , 2011 Peltier, 2001) , and to CI dependency analysis risk assessment methodologies (e.g., Aung and Watanabe, 2009; De Porcellinis et al., 2009; Haimes et al., 2007; Hokstad et al., 2013; ISO, 2009a; Ntouskas and Polemi, 2012; Theoharidou et al., 2011; Zio and Sansavini, 2011) , all the way to sector specific frameworks as, for example, in the maritime sector (e.g., Ntouskas and Polemi, 2012; Polemi and Ntouskas, 2012) . Most of these standards specify framework conditions for the risk management process, but do not provide specific methodologies targeted to SC risk assessment. In principle, choosing the right method and tool for risk assessment proves to be complicated. Since SCs are originating from a business context, SC risk management methods are usually quantitative and are based on monetary costs or potential impact (e.g., Giannopoulus et al., 2012; ISO, 2007; Polemi and Ntouskas, 2012) . In practice, the selection of a specific risk-assessment tool is based on practical considerations, and depends on how a specific risk assessment methodology can be mapped to the extended risk assessment needs of SC.
Security and risk management in the transportation sector (a key sector for SC management) emphasises the concept of safety (physical security). For example, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (as well as the respective EU regulation EC725/2004) defines a set of measures to enhance the physical security of port facilities and ships. Methodologies for security assessment are described and guidelines for the implementation of the respective security measures are provided. Additionally, roles and responsibilities concerning maritime security at various levels are defined. Nevertheless, due to the increased interaction and exchange of information of ports with other CIs in the maritime eco-system (e.g., port authorities, ministries, maritime companies, ship industry, etc.) the sole focus on physical security is not sufficient as the security of the port's ICT systems becomes equally important.
ISO 28001 (2007) is the security management standard specifically developed for SC, due to an increased demand from the transportation and logistics industry. It specifies the requirements for a SC security management system, including aspects related to financing, manufacturing, information management and the facilities for packing, storing and transferring goods between modes of transport and locations. ISO 28001 is applicable to all sizes of organisations in manufacturing, service, storage or transportation at any stage of the SC. The standard defines the need for certification by an accredited third party and/or a self-declaration of conformance with the standard. ISO 28001 describes a generic methodology and provides a generic guideline for organisations seeking to implement or refine a specific methodology. Finally, NIST IR 7622 (2012) aims to provide a notional set of SC assurance methods and practices that offer a SC security management for federal information systems. Although in NIST (2012) , the need for a SC risk management methodology is recognised, the document itself does not define such a methodology.
Preliminaries and building blocks of the Medusa methodology
The define of a risk assessment methodology targeted to the assessment of SC services, requires several steps, in order to: a model the SC b collect the required input from the involved entities c define threats that are relevant to SC d define the appropriate security controls e define the appropriate scales for all the risk assessment parameters.
Before the steps of the methodology itself are presented, we first describe in this section in detail all the preliminary building blocks that are required by the Medusa methodology.
Basic terms and notations
We will use the following general notation and concepts. Most of the terminology related with SC is in accordance to the ISO 28001 (2007) standard, while generic risk assessment terminology is in compliance with ISO 27001 (2013).
BP: are those contractors, suppliers or service providers that an organisation contracts with to assist the organisation in its function as an 'organisation in the supply chain'.
SC: is the linked set of resources and processes that upon placement of a purchase order begins with the sourcing of raw material and extends through the manufacturing, processing, handling and delivery of goods and related services to the purchaser.
SCS: is a service provided and/or supported by a SC.
Security declaration statement: is a documented commitment by a BP, which specifies security measures implemented by that BP, including, at a minimum, how goods and physical instruments of international trade are safeguarded, associated information is protected and security measures are demonstrated and verified.
Security threat: a unique incident (deliberate or accidental) that may lead to some consequence in one or more BPs in the SC.
Security threat scenario: are the means by which a potential security incident might occur. A security threat scenario may imply the instantiation of more than one security threat within the SC.
Cascading threat: a security threat scenario that cascades from one BP to another due to their dependencies.
Vulnerability level: a measure of the level of exposure of a BP to a threat scenario.
Likelihood: refers to the ease or difficulty with which a security threat scenario could progress to become a security incident. Likelihood is evaluated based on the resistance the security processes in place pose to a security incident involving the security threat scenario being examined and is expressed either qualitatively or quantitatively. Likelihood takes into consideration the threat level and the vulnerability level.
Consequence: refers to the loss of life, damage to property or economic disruption, including disruption to transport systems, which can reasonably be expected as a result of an attack on an organisation in the SC or by the use of the SC as a weapon.
Risk: a metric that represents how dangerous a security threat is for a given entity [either for a BP(s) and/or for the whole SC]. The risk level is computed based on the consequence level and the likelihood of a threat. Partial risk: the risk level that refers to the risk exposure of one BP within a SC, for a threat scenario under examination. The partial risk is a metric that shows the level of risk for a particular BP that is participating in a SC.
SC overall risk:
The risk level that refers to the risk exposure of the whole SC. The overall risk is computed, using a worst-case approach, as the maximum partial risk of all the BPs within a SC, for a threat scenario under examination. The SC overall risk is a metric that shows how critical is the SC as a whole.
Cascading risk:
The risk level that a BP in a SC is exposed, based on its dependencies on other BPs. For a given threat scenario, a different cascading risk is computed for each different incoming n-order dependency of a BP (see Section 3.2 for graph-based terminology).
SCS graph model
Medusa SC risk assessment relies on SC directed dependency graphs, used to visualise the dependencies within a SC [see Figure 1 for an example of a supply chain graph (SCG)]: 1 SC directed graph: a directed graph SCG = (N, ε) where N is the set nodes and ε is the set of edges.
a Node x i ε N: it represents a BP participating in a SC required for the provision of a service (SCS).
b Directed edge x i → x j ε. It represents a business process provided by x i to x j in order to support the provisioning of a SCS.
2 Weight of x i (w i ): The importance of x i for the provisioning of the SCS. It represents the business impact of a BP (node) for the provisioning of the SCS. The following scale is used: a w(x i ) = 1 (high) if its absence/disruption of its operations results to severe delay/disruption of the provisioning of the SCS. b w(x i ) = 0.5 (medium) if its absence/disruption of its operations results to important delay/disruption of the provisioning of the SCS. c w(x i ) = 0.25 (low) if its absence/disruption of its operations results to limited delay/disruption of the provisioning of the SCS.
3 Type of dependency: four types of dependencies are defined between BPs x i and x j . a D(x i , x j ) = 1 if access to cyber-systems and e-data: the access could be to a database, to operational systems, networks, etc. b D(x i , x j ) = 2 if interaction with cyber-systems and e-data: the interaction could be by sharing information, the offer of common services, etc. c D(x i , x j ) = 3 if access to physical facilities: these facilities are buildings, terminals, storage rooms, etc. d D(x i , x j ) = 4 if usage of physical facilities: the use could be for warehousing, for hosting an installation, etc. Note that the dependency types do not capture other types of dependencies, such as social dependencies, since such types of dependencies cannot always be represented in a legal form and captured in a security declaration statement between the BPs of a SC.
Order of dependency -order(x i , x j ): The order of a BP x j in relation to another BP x i is defined as the number of steps required for x i to reach x j using the smallest length (shortest) path; order(x i , x j ) = min({|path(x i , x j )|}). For example in Figure 1 we have, order(x 0 , x 8 ) = 1 and order(x 5 , x 0 ) = 2.
Security declaration statements
ISO 28001 imposes the requirement that each BP within a SC to maintain a security declaration statement. As explained in Section 3.1, a security declaration statement is a documented commitment that defines the security measures implemented by each BP, related with the security assurance of the examined SC. Medusa extends the declaration statement as defined in ISO28001 in the following ways:
1 It assigns each statement with a particular security requirement with a unique ID. Then each security requirement will be mapped to the corresponding security vulnerability and security control, following the same ID. For example, the security requirement R1.1 will correspond to a security vulnerability V1.1 and security control C1.1. More details are given in the following section (Section 3.4).
2 It allows BPs to declare partial implementation of controls.
A part of a security declaration statement is shown in Table 1 , while Appendix presents the complete declaration statement used in Medusa. 
Define security requirements, vulnerabilities and controls
Based on the security requirements for SC security, as defined in the declaration statement described above, Medusa defines a complete list of security vulnerabilities and their corresponding security controls, which are required in order to secure a system against the particular vulnerability. A list of security vulnerabilities and security controls that are related with SC security are defined, based on the Security Declaration Statements, as defined in ISO 28001 (2007) . Medusa provides a detailed list of security vulnerabilities and controls that are in accordance with ISO 28001, are categorised in seven security areas:
1 management of SC security 2 security plan 3 asset security 4 personnel security 5 information security 6 goods and conveyance security 7 closed cargo transport units security. Table 2 presents as an example, a part of the list associated with the area of information security. Threat against the life of people, (business partner's personnel, people using the SC, etc.).
Take hostages/kill people. The cargo received or delivered by/to a wrong person due to the luck of appropriate authentication procedures.
The cargo transport related procedures have been alternated, and the activities have been misused.
Closed cargo has been unsealed illegally.
Closed cargo contains wrong material.
An employee or business partner in the SC is stealing SC-goods.
Unauthorised access to all cargo and conveyance storage areas.
Define threat scenarios
A threat categorisation provides a systematic definition of threat categories so that:
a Individual threat scenarios can be systematically identified and categorised for each SCS, in a structured manner.
b Threat scenarios can be effectively mapped to the appropriate security controls and evaluated for their vulnerability in each BP participating in the SCS.
Medusa utilises the threat categories defined in ISO 28001 and extends the examined threat scenarios as described in Table 3 . Note that this categorisation is not distinctive and several threat scenarios may partially belong to more than one category. 
The Medusa methodology is based on a static mapping of the security threat scenarios to their corresponding security vulnerabilities and required security controls. After the security vulnerabilities and the examined threat scenarios have been defined, the mapping of threat scenarios to security vulnerabilities and controls presented in Table 4 is used.
Define risk related scales

Threat scale definition
We use a five-level Likert scale in order to describe the threat level for an examined threat scenario. When selecting the most appropriate threat level, a BP will consider the expected probability of occurrence of the examined threat scenario within its assets and premises. This threat scenario is expected to occur within the assets of the business partner with very high probability (more than 80% probability)
This threat scenario was realised more than once in the last year (12 month period).
High (4) (60-80) 80
This threat scenario is expected to occur within the assets of the business partner with high probability (61%-80% probability)
This threat scenario was realised once in the last 1 year (12 month period).
Medium (3) (40-60) 60
This threat scenario is expected to occur within the assets of the business partner with medium probability (41%-60% probability)
More than one incident of this threat was realised in the last 2 years.
Low (2) (20-40) 40
This threat scenario is expected to occur within the assets of the business partner with low probability (21%-40% probability)
At most one incident of this threat was realised in the last 2 years.
Very low (1) (1-20) 20 This threat scenario is expected to occur within the assets of the business partner with very low probability (at most 20% probability)
At most one incident of this threat was realised in the last 3 years.
Likelihood scale
The likelihood of occurrence of a threat scenario takes as input a threat level and a vulnerability level and outputs the likelihood of occurrence for the particular threat scenario within a BP. In Section 4.3 we describe in detail how the likelihood of occurrence of a threat scenario on a BP is calculated. The likelihood scale defined by the Medusa methodology is described in Table 6 . 
Consequence scale
We will adopt in the Medusa methodology the following consequence scale, based on the outcome of the deliverable D3.1 (Section 3.3 of D3.1) as shown in Table 5 . In particular we define five impact (consequence) classes, ranging from 'minimal' to 'very significant', corresponding to cardinal numbers 1 to 5. Each impact class is then assigned to a value range (in a 1-100 scale) and to a default value. In the proposed classification table, the societal impact is aligned with the disruption of the SCS. Our consequence scale is in line with topics covered by typical business impact analysis such as human impact, financial loss, reputational loss and the loss of the competitive position (British Standard Institute, 2006) . Since SC are related with BPs that comprise CIs, the impact analysis is more complex. For example, an incident in a port will affect not only the port itself but might also affect other entities related with the port and relying on it as an infrastructure. Therefore, when looking at the potential impacts of a port, the analysis should be much more oriented towards impact analyses and risk analyses done on a national level [as, for example, in Germany (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014) 
Risk scale
The risk level of a threat scenario takes as input a likelihood level and a consequence level and outputs the risk of an examined threat scenario for the BP in question. The risk scale defined and utilised by the Medusa methodology is described in Table 8 . In Section 4 we describe in detail how the risk is calculated. 
The Medusa risk assessment SC methodology
The main design criteria of the Medusa SC risk assessment methodology are:
Holistic view: Medusa aims to provide a holistic SC view in order to identify global SC threats, such as the cascading threats within the SC. These may not always be easy to identify from an organisation-centric perspective.
Collaborative: Medusa aims to promote collaboration between BPs.
Compliance with standards: Medusa will be compliant with a range of existing standards such as ISO (2011 ISO ( . 2007 ISO ( , 2013 , as a means of increasing its adoption and longevity.
Business-centric:
The importance of the BPs in the provision of the SCS is considered (providing more targeted risk assessment results).
Implementable:
The Medusa methodology adopts a sequential step-by-step approach with clear inputs and outputs so it can be easy be implemented in an ICT tool.
Sector-independent:
Medusa methodological steps could be applied in other sectors (e.g., business, health, transport) where SCS are offered.
Auditable:
The results produced may be easily compared with other risk assessment methodological approaches since it uses standardised notations.
Initially, the BPs (or the risk assessor that initiates the risk assessment in consensus with the BPs) shall define the scope of the SCS under examination and define the goal, the scope, and the outcome of the SCS. The risk assessor may create use-cases to clarify the business processes of the SCS, clarify its business role and functions within it. The outcome of this step is a Statement of Application that defines the SCS under examination and its boundaries.
Step 1: analysis of the SCS
In this step the SCS is analysed and modelled using graphs.
Step 1.1: creating a SCS graph model
Business process modelling of the SCS is based on SCG, defined in Section 3.2. The BPs will provide input related with their business role and dependencies within the SCS. By using this input, the assessor will design the SCG corresponding to the SCS (as shown in Figure 1 ).
Step 1.2: filling and signing BPs declaration statements
In this step, all BPs will provide their completed and signed security declaration statements defined in Section 3.3. The BPs will provide their security declaration statements (shown in Appendix) that will be used by the Medusa methodology, in order to assess the vulnerability level of each BP against each particular security threat scenario.
Step 2: threat scenario identification
Based on the threat categorisation defined in Section 3.5, in this step all the BPs will identify specific threat scenarios from each threat category, that are relevant to the SCS under examination. At least the threat scenarios described in Table 4 will be examined. Each BP may identify additional Security Scenarios which may not be included in Table  4 . The definition of threat scenarios however is a task that will require security expertise and is therefore recommended to be implemented under the guidance of the security officers of each BP involved. These new threat scenarios will also be assigned to one of the threat categories as defined in Table 3 .
Step 3: likelihood analysis
In this step, the expected likelihood for each possible threat scenario for the SCS under examination will be estimated. Each BP will assess the likelihood of each threat scenario, taking into consideration two values; a threat value, reflecting the probability of occurrence, and a vulnerability value, reflecting the current level of protection against a particular threat scenario. We describe in detail the calculation of the threat, vulnerability and likelihood level.
Threat assessment model
For each examined SCS, the probability of occurrence for each possible threat scenario is assessed. The probability of a threat scenario is defined as the expected frequency of appearance, based on the threat level scale defined in Table 5 . When selecting the threat level for an examined threat scenario, a BP will consider the expected probability of occurrence of the examined threat scenario within the BP itself (i.e., the probability that the threat is initialised within its own systems and/or premises).
To assist the BP in estimating a Threat level, two selection criteria are provided in Table 5: a the probability of occurrence b the history of previous incidents.
The responder may select one answer for each of the above criteria (possibly belonging to a different scale). If the answers provided by the BP belong to a different scale, then the highest scale is selected, the final outcome will be the default value corresponding to the highest value from the selected answers. Thus the methodology will always use one of the five default values, as a percentage value (very low = 20%, low = 40%, medium = 60%, high = 80%, very high = 100%). Let t i (TS j ) denote the probability of a particular threat scenario TS j being realised, as assessed by the BP x i (or the risk assessor in consensus with the BP).
Example: Assume that for a SCS under examination and for a particular threat scenario TS j the BP x i believes that the probability of occurrence of TS j in the premises of x i is about 50% (corresponding to the threat level 'medium'). In addition, x i replies that TS j has a history of one incident in the last 12 months (corresponding to the threat level 'high'). Based on the answers of the BP and on Table 5 , the Threat level assigned is: t i (TS j ) = High(= 80%).
Vulnerability assessment
Lack of security controls for a threat scenario will lead to a high vulnerability of against this particular threat scenario. Vulnerability assessment will make use of the security declaration statements completed by each BP (see Table 1 ), where each BP has already provided information related with the implementation level of security controls related with the SC. In addition, the mapping of the threat categories (and consequently of threat scenarios) to the required security controls as described in Table 2 , can be combined to provide a complete view of the level of implementation of the security controls for each examined threat. As shown in Figure 3 , the Medusa system transparently uses this information, provided once in the security declaration statement, in order to evaluate the vulnerability level for each examined threat scenario. Each security control, is in one of the three possible states: fully defined (with a score 2), partially defined (score 1), or Not implemented (score 0).
In each BP, the vulnerability level for each Threat Scenario is evaluated as follows; let v i (TS j ) denote the vulnerability level of x i for a threat scenario TS j . For each threat, let Impl max (TS j ) denote the maximum possible implementation score that a BP would get, if all the proposed controls for this threat were fully implemented. Let Impl i (TS j ) denote the implementation score of the BP x i for the threat scenario TS j as computed based on Table  3 . Then the vulnerability level of the BP x i for the threat scenario TS j is computed as:
The vulnerability level for each threat scenario is automatically calculated by the Medusa system for all the BPs and for all possible threat scenarios, using the completed security declaration statements and the assignment of threat scenarios to security vulnerabilities, as described in Table 4 . Thus the BP does not need to perform any additional action in order to evaluate all the vulnerability levels.
Likelihood assessment
The likelihood assessment for each examined threat scenario is computed as the product of the relative threat and vulnerability values. The likelihood of occurrence of a threat scenario to a BP is computed as:
Step 4: consequence analysis
For each examined SCS, the consequence for each possible threat scenario is assessed by each BP, using the consequence scale defined in Table 7 . The responder may select more than one description of consequence from Table 7, but the final consequence level will be the value that corresponds to the highest possible consequence from the selected answers.
It is important to note that when selecting a consequence level for a threat scenario, each BP will assess the worst-case consequence that the BP may experience, if the particular threat scenario were realised in any node within the SC (not in particular in the same BP). Thus the consequence assessment already considers the potential consequence of a cascading threat, for the given threat scenario and the methodology will always use one of the five default values: very significant (derived value 100), significant (80), average (60), minor (40), and minimal (20). Let c i (TS j ) denote the consequence of a particular threat scenario TS j being realised, as assessed by the BP x i (or the risk assessor in consensus with the BP).
Step 5: risk assessment
In this step, the likelihood and consequence values calculated in the previous steps will be combined in order to calculate, for each threat scenario: a the partial risk level for each BP b the overall risk level that characterises the whole SCS.
Partial and overall SC risk assessment evaluation
In this step, each BP assesses the risk for each threat scenario, using as input the likelihood values (as described in Section 4.3.3) and the consequence values (as described in Section 4.4). To calculate the final risk level, the risk scale described in Table 8 is used. The partial risk level of the BP x i for the examined threat scenario TS j is calculated as:
The overall risk level characterises the risk level of the whole SCS and is calculated as:
Here we compute the partial risk level for each BP, as computed in Section 3.6.1, weighted by the business importance w i as provided by the BPs in Step 1.1 of the methodology. The reason behind this is that the overall risk level that characterises the whole SCS as an entity, should also consider the business importance of the BPs for the provision of the service. The maximum weighted partial risk value will be the overall risk level. Figure 5 shows an example of the risk assessment calculation by the Medusa system.
Step 6: cascading risk assessment
In this step, the risk assessor will make use of all the risk parameters computed in the previous steps, in order to evaluate the effect of potential cascading threats for each examined threat scenario. The cascading risk assessment evaluation is based on a modified version of the methodology proposed in Kotzanikolaou et al. (2013) . First all possible cascading paths are defined, based on the dependencies between the BPs within the SCG (as shown in Figure 1 ). Then, the expected dependency risk of each examined dependency chain for each examined threat scenario is computed, based on the following algorithm:
1 Define a minimum and a maximum path length ℓ min and ℓ max respectively. Typical values are dependency paths between two to five nodes.
2 Each node within the SCG will be examined as a potential initiator of a cascading chain. Without loss of generality, say y 0 that is the source node of a chain.
3 For each examined source node y 0 , identify all possible dependency chains that initiate from y 0 with length between ℓ min and ℓ max . Without loss of generality, say that y 0 → y 1 → ··· y n is one dependency chain initiating from the node y 0 .
4 For each identified dependency chain, use the following steps to assess the risk of the dependency chain. a For each threat scenario TS j : i For each node acting as a source node y 0 :
For each dependency chain y 0 → y 1 → ··· y n initiating from y 0 (with length between ℓ min and ℓ max ), compute the cumulative cascading dependency risk R 01…n (TS j ) as:
The likelihood product, defined in equation (5) is a recursive ordered operation, where the left-most (first) pair always has the highest priority. The product of the Likelihood values, defined in the equation (5) above, is computed based on Table 9 . Note that Table 9 is constructed in such a way that the product of likelihood operation is commutative. However, we note that since the product of likelihood operator is ordered, the operation is not associative. By using an ordered non-associative operation to compute the product of likelihood in the cascading risk calculation, we achieve the following properties.
1 The likelihood value of the source node of the dependency chain has the lowest effect on the final outcome, while the likelihood value assessed by the destination of the dependency chain always has the highest weight in the final result.
2 As a result, equation (5) succeeds to capture the distance of a BP from the source of the event. Due to the ordered definition of the operator, the effect of the most distant nodes (the nodes having dependencies of higher order with the destination of the examined cascading threat) will 'fade off' faster than the effect on the nodes which are closer to the examined destination (target) of the cascade threat. The following example clarifies these properties. Table 9 Product of likelihood values calculation
Example: Assume that for a SCS under examination, the likelihood, consequence and partial risk values shown in Table 10 hold. Let us assume that the SCG in question includes the dependency chain: Now by using equation (5) we will compute all the dependency risk values for node 1 Calculation of the first-order dependency risk value(s) for node x 3 : based on the examined chain x 1 → x 2 → x 3 we have one such 1st-order dependency for the node x 3 and we compute (we omit the for simplicity): Interestingly, the 1st-order dependency risk of x 3 , r 23 = low, which is higher than the partial risk r 3 (= very low).
2 Calculation of the second-order dependency risk value(s) for node x 3 : Based on the examined chain x 1 → x 2 → x 3 we have one such 2nd-order dependency for the node x 3 and we compute: Note that the effect of the right-most likelihood value (i.e., the likelihood assessed by the destination of the cascading chain) in the final product of the likelihood, is higher that the effect of the left-most value (the source of the chain). Indeed, observe that in the above example, if the operator was computed with a right-most priority, the estimated likelihood would be different ((VL·(H · VH)) = VL · VH = M), ultimately resulting to a higher cascading risk. The definition of the product of likelihood operator as a left-most ordered operation favours the likelihood values of the nodes having smaller distance (order of dependency) to the destination of the cascade risk value, as required by the methodology. Figure 6 shows an example of the cascading risk assessment by the Medusa system
Remark: The cascading dependency risk captures the risk that a BP may experience within the SC, due to a (related) Threat Scenario being realised in another BP from whom the BP in question has a dependency. Recall that when providing the consequence level, each BP considers the worst-case impact for itself, regardless of the initiator of the threat scenario that may cause the consequence to happen. On the other hand, the likelihood value computed for each BP, only considers that the business in question will initiate the Threat Scenario. The cascading dependency risk captures the cascading effect of a Threat Scenario realised in some BP, to affect others due to their (direct or indirect) dependencies from the source of the event.
Step 7: risk mitigation
This step of the methodology aims to assure an acceptable risk level for the whole SCS. The basic idea is to calculate the risk level of each BP in the SC for every possible threat. In case that there are some BPs that do not satisfy the desired risk level (acceptable threshold), the methodology needs to determine which security controls must be implemented and which partners need to implement them in order to resolve these issues. We break the methodology in two algorithms: the first is for the SC as a whole and the second is for the cascading dependency chains. Before we present the algorithms, we will introduce some terminology.
Recall the partial risk level r i (TS j ) of BP x i for threat scenario TS j , will be used as a metric for the prioritisation of possible additional security controls. Furthermore, recall the overall risk level, R(TS j ), characterising the risk level of the whole SC, will be used as a metric to define a baseline risk level (the minimum acceptable security level) for anyone participating in the SCS. The goal will be to reduce the risk level r i (TS j ) of every BP (and consequently R(TS j ) below the risk threshold, by applying additional security controls.
The Medusa system: implementation of the medusa methodology
The Medusa system implements the Medusa methodology and aims to systematically evaluate the security risks affecting the SC BPs within a SCS. Figure 2 depicts the overall architecture of the Medusa system that consists of four main conceptual layers; users, information assets, components and technological infrastructure. These layers constitute the conceptual pillars for building and implementing the ICT tools that will support the modelling and visualisation of the various security-related risks and interdependencies. More specifically:
Layer 1 System users: Medusa ecosystem consists of the following user groups;
Security manager: The purpose of the security manager is to initialise the system with information that is globally available to the other two roles. In particular, he/she has to refine and populate the closed 'closed lists'/vocabularies that will be used by the other layers.
SCS security officer: he/she is responsible for the initiation of a risk assessment and the specification of the SCS that will be examined identifying all the involved BPs and the supported processes.
BP representative: the representative of a BP (e.g., customs, insurance company, shipping company, maritime ministries, public authorities) that participate in the SCS evaluation process and provide information relating to the threats, vulnerability and controls that belong to the area of his/her responsibility.
These user groups are defined according to their roles, requirements and responsibilities therefore, they have different access rights to the components and tools of the system. Layer 2 SCS risk assessment information assets: All user groups provide initial content to the system including but not limited to the following; threat scenarios, security controls, vulnerabilities and types of enumerations such as types of dependencies (e.g., access to cyber-systems and e-data, access to physical facilities), types of BPs (e.g., ports, customs, importers, exporters, ship owners), categories of consequences and scale of risks, threats and consequences (e.g., high).
Layer 3 SCS risk assessment components: All SCS risk assessment Assets are accessed, properly managed and processed by the implemented components. These components are;
Administration module: allows customising the parameters, elements and features (e.g., threats, vulnerabilities, controls) required for the execution of a risk assessment process based on the defined Medusa methodology.
Initialisation module: allows the initiation of a risk assessment and the definition of the SCS that will be examined.
Risk evaluation module: gives the opportunity to the users to assess the partial risk level of the involved BPs for the examined threat scenarios partial risk of the examined SCS.
Risk management module: allows the review of the risk assessment results and the calculation of the cumulative cascading dependency risk values for the applicable threat scenarios.
Layer 4 The Medusa technological infrastructure: All different modules, sub-systems and primary services that comprise the Medusa system.
In this context, the Medusa system models and implements the main steps of the proposed Medusa SCRA methodology, described in Section 4, in a graphical way using visualisation tools, simulation processes, automated routines and structured content. The adopted approach encapsulates several simplifications and incorporate automated steps in order to deliver and provide automated analysis and evaluation of all activities comprising a SCS taking into consideration their complexity and distributed nature. In particular, as shown in Figure 3 , the Medusa system transparently uses the implementation level of the relevant security controls, provided once in the security declaration statement, in order to evaluate the vulnerability level for each examined threat scenario (Step 1.2).
In Figure 4 , all threat scenarios that are relevant to the vehicles transport SCS are evaluated by (Step 3). Figure 5 shows the overall risk levels of the vehicles transport SCS for all examined threat scenarios as calculated by the Medusa system (Step 5). Threat scenarios are ranked according to their derived risk level.
Finally, Figure 6 shows all possible dependency chains and present the corresponding cascading dependency risk values (Step 6).
Figure 6
The cascading dependency risk assessment phase by the Medusa system (see online version for colours)
Experimental validation of the Medusa methodology
Based on the pilot tests of the Medusa project, we used reference scenarios in order to validate the proposed methodology and the integrated algorithms in terms of:
Validating the evaluation of the partial and overall risks.
Validating the evaluation of the multi-order dependencies and risks.
Validating the consistency of the results, by escalating the values of all the parameters of the methodology.
The test scenarios described below are based on realistic scenarios of SC and of threat scenarios provided by the end-users of the Medusa project (EUROPHAR) and the organisations supporting the project's activities (Piraeus Port Authority, Valencia Port Authority, Port of Castellon, Port of Alicante and FEPORTS). In total, the validation scenarios described bellow and implemented in the Medusa project were conducted with the participation of more than 401 port operators, government officials, leading experts from the maritime, oil and gas sector and security and risk management professionals and experts.
Test scenario: the 'vehicles' transport' SCS
In order to validate the accuracy, robustness, efficiency and reliability of the Medusa risk management methodology, we will use the purchase and shipment SC sub process of the 'vehicles transport service'. This process is initiated by the importer which sends a purchase order to the industry for a number of vehicles. Once both have agreed upon the terms of the contract (pricing, documentation, freight charges, currency, etc.), the industry contracts a ship agent to deliver the vehicles to the destination port. The ship agent makes the arrangements with the ship owner to assure usage of ships; with customs authorities to arrange for the manifest registration number; with the departure port authority to arrange the ship formalities related to the authorisation process from the entry of the ship into the port until its exit and then proceed to load the vehicles into the vessel for shipment to the destination port. The ship agent contracts a vehicle transport agent and assigns the transfer of the vehicles from the industry to the departure port. Finally, the ship agent sends the relevant documentation to the importer's local agent who has the responsibility for the ship arrival and the regional procedure of delivering the vessel to the importer. Figure 7 shows the SCG representing the dependencies between all the above entities (cyber or physical ones). 
Validation scenarios
Within the context of the experimental validation process of the abovementioned part of the 'vehicles transport service' the following scenarios will be examined:
Validation scenario 1: Implementation of different combinations of security controls.
Validation scenario 2:
Variation of the expected consequences.
Validation scenario 3:
Variation of the likelihood of occurrence of threat scenarios.
Validation scenario 4:
Overall and cascading dependency risks validation.
Validation scenario 1: implementation of different combinations of security controls
In the first validation scenario, for the purchase and shipment SC sub-process, we will examine the threat TS 1.1 (destroy a major/critical SC infrastructure); in particular, we will explore how the risk value of TS 1.1 changes if a BPs (i.e., port authority -x 0 ) applies different mitigations controls. It should be noted that the vulnerability level of the port (x 0 ) for the threat scenario TS 1.1 (as well as for any examined threat) is automatically calculated based on the implementation level of security controls related with it. Thus each BP will provide once all the required input related with the implementation level of its security controls, and the vulnerability level of each threat is automatically calculated. For the examined scenario the relevant controls are C 1.1 , C 1.2 , C 2.1 , C 2.2 , C 2.3 , C 3.1 , C 3.2 , C 3.3 and C 3.4 . In order to validate the consistency of the methodology, we will examine the behaviour of Medusa assuming there are in place various combinations of security controls. Each combination of implemented security controls simulates a different security implementation maturity level, for the related security controls. We examine the following four different combinations of security controls for the port authority:
Security controls combination A (SCC A ): all the proposed controls related with the examined threat are fully implemented.
Security controls combination B (SCC B )
: all the proposed controls related with the examined threat are partially implemented.
Security controls combination C (SCC C ):
one-third of the proposed controls are fully implemented, one-third is partially implemented and one-third of the related security controls are not implemented.
Security controls combination D (SCC D )
: none of the proposed controls related with the examined threat are implemented.
Notice that the above combinations of security controls implementation attempt to capture both extreme cases (all controls are implemented -SCC A , no controls are implemented -SCC D ), as well as intermediate scenarios of control implementation maturity. The combination SCC C would be more realistic, since the high-level controls are first assumed as fully implemented, and as the controls become more low-level, the implementation level decreases. Table 11 presents the case scenarios that have been executed.
Case scenario 1a:
In the first case, we assume that the probability of occurrence of threat scenario TS 1.1 is more than 80% and its expected consequences are 'very significant'. The results as derived from the above combinations of security controls show that if the expected vulnerability level between two cases is equal, despite the exact combination of implemented controls (cases SCC B and SCC C ) then the resulting risk level is the same. Intermediate scenarios were also tested as sub-cases and also proved consistency of the tool. For example if the combination of control implementation gives low vulnerability level (e.g., 20%) then the expected risk will be low.
Case scenario 1b:
Assuming that the probability of occurrence of threat scenario TS 1.1 is more than 80% and the consequences that the organisation would experience is minimal, we can infer that a threat scenario with an expected minimal consequence level will always output a very low risk, despite of the other parameters (e.g., implemented controls).
Case scenario 1c: if the probability of occurrence of this scenario is about 10% (corresponding to the threat level 'very low') and the consequences of the particular threat scenario being realised are 'very significant', then taking account the above security controls combinations we can say that a threat scenario with an expected very low probability of occurrence will always output a very low risk, despite of the other parameters.
Case scenario 1d: In this case, we consider that the probability of occurrence of this scenario is about 'medium' and the possible consequences are 'very significant'. The derived results show that a threat scenario of very high significance will exhibit a risk level depending on its likelihood of occurrence (which is calculated based on the threat a vulnerability levels). 
Validation scenario 2: variation of the expected consequences
In the second scenario, we will gradually change the level of the expected consequences of a threat scenario TS 1.1 , while maintaining the same values for the threat and vulnerability level, in order to inspect how the corresponding risk value is affected. At this point we will investigate how the variations in the consequence affect the risk level.
In this context, we assume that the potential consequences of the particular threat scenario vary as follows:
Consequence scenario A (CS A ): the consequences that the organisation would experience are 'very significant'
Consequence scenario B (CS B )
: the consequences that the organisation would experience are 'significant'.
Consequence scenario C (CS C )
: the consequences that the organisation would experience are 'average'.
Consequence scenario D (CS D )
: the consequences that the organisation would experience are 'minor'.
Consequence scenario E (CS E )
: the consequences that the organisation would experience are 'minimal'.
The following five main cases have been examined (results shown in Table 12 ):
Case scenario 2a: In this case, we make the following assumptions for the port (x 0 ):
1 The probability of occurrence of the threat TS 1.1 at the port's premises is more than 80% (corresponding to the threat level 'very high'). 2 The port applies a combination of security controls that based on the vulnerability level formula defined in methodology, the vulnerability level of the port authority of the examined threat scenario is rather high (72%). The above combination leads to a high likelihood value for all the examined cases.
Case scenario 2b:
The assumptions made for the port (x 0 ) are the following: 1 The examined threat scenario TS 1.1 is very likely to occur (corresponding to the threat level 'very high'). 2 The port does not apply any security controls related to this threat; therefore, based on the defined score the vulnerability level of the port is very high (100%).The above combination leads to a very high likelihood value for all the examined cases.
Case scenario 2c: The assumptions are made for the port (x 0 ) are the following:
1 The probability of occurrence of the examined threat scenario TS 1.1 is 'high'. 2 The port partially applies all the security controls related to this threat. The above combination leads to a medium likelihood value for all the examined cases.
Case scenario 2d: In this scenario, for the port (x 0 ), we assume that:
1 The examined threat scenario TS 1.1 has a medium probability of occurrence (corresponding to the threat level 'medium'). 2
The port applies a set of security controls that stands for a low-to-medium (38%) vulnerability level. The above combination leads to a low likelihood value for all the examined cases.
Case scenario 2e: In last case: 1 The examined threat scenario TS 1.1 has low probability of occurrence (corresponding to the 'low' threat level); the port (x 0 ) implements few of the proposed security controls for this threat, based on which the calculated vulnerability level for the examined threat is high (83%).
The results of the validation scenario 2, showed, for all the sub-cases (2a-2e), that the risk values for all cases were as expected and consistent with the risk calculation process of the Medusa methodology. As the consequence value varies while all the other parameters are not changed, the derived risk depends on the variation of the consequence level. The sub-cases capture various cases of threat-vulnerability combinations, where in each sub-case the derived likelihood value is the same.
Validation scenario 3: variation of the probability of occurrence of threat scenarios
The main objective of the third validation scenario is to investigate how the risk of a threat occurring varies as the threat level (probability of occurrence) of the particular threat varies. In this context, we study the following five frequency scenarios (see Table 13 ):
Frequency scenario A (FS A ):
The examined threat scenario is 'very likely' to occur.
Frequency scenario B (FS B ):
The examined threat scenario is 'likely' to occur.
Frequency scenario C (FS C ):
The examined threat scenario has 'medium likelihood' to occur.
Frequency scenario D (FS D ):
The examined threat scenario is 'unlikely' to occur.
Frequency scenario E (FS E ):
The examined threat scenario is 'very unlikely' to occur. 
Case scenarios Case scenario 3c Case scenario 3d
Frequency scenario
The consequences that the port (x 0 ) would experience due to TS 1.1 being realised are 'very significant'. 2 The port (x 0 ) implements a set of security controls related with this threat, based on this implementation the derived vulnerability level is medium (45%).
The results of this case show that a threat scenario of very high significance will exhibit a risk level depending on its likelihood of occurrence (which is calculated based on the threat and vulnerability levels). By maintaining the vulnerability level at a constant value and by varying the threat level from Very Low to Very High, we can verify that the resulting risk level is gradually increasing based on the derived likelihood level.
Case scenario 3b: We assume that: 1 The consequences that the port (x 0 ) would experience due to TS 1.1 being realised are 'minimal'. 2 The port (x 0 ) implements only few of the proposed controls for this threat; thus, the corresponding vulnerability level is high (72%).
The results deduce that a threat scenario of very low significance (minimal consequence) will always exhibit a very low risk level regardless of the threat level.
Case scenario 3c: In this case, we assume that:
1 The possible consequences of the TS 1.1 to the port (x 0 ) are 'average'. 2 The port (x 0 ) implements partially all the proposed controls for this threat deriving in a vulnerability level of 50%.
The results show that a threat scenario with an expected medium significance (average consequence) with a medium vulnerability level will at worst exhibit a low risk level regardless of the threat level.
Case scenario 3d: We made the following assumptions: 1 The possible consequences of the TS 1.1 to the port (x 0 ) are 'average'. 2 The port (x 0 ) implements most of the proposed controls for this threat deriving in a very low vulnerability level of 17%. Based on the results of this case, a threat scenario with a very high consequence level and with a very low vulnerability level will at worst exhibit a low risk level regardless of the threat level. The variance of the threat level influences the transience from the very low to the low risk level, when the threat level is expected to be high or very high.
Validation scenario 4: cascading dependency risks validation
In the above sections, various scenarios validating the risk assessment in a single BP were presented. Those scenarios covered all the parameters of the methodology, used in risk assessment (threat, vulnerability and consequence levels). This section presents a validation scenario covering the cascading dependency effects associated with the purchase and shipment SC sub process of the 'vehicles transport service'.
In particular, we use the threat scenario TS 1.1 (destroy a major/critical SC Infrastructure) in order to examine the cascading aspects of the proposed methodology. Assuming that the threat and consequence values for TS 1.1 shown in Table 14 were provided by each BP and that the vulnerability values were computed by applying equation (5) on the input provided by the security declaration statement of each partner, then the partial risk values for this threat scenario are calculated. 
Based on the above values we examined the cascading dependency risk values for the following case:
Dependency scenario: the port authority is the destination of the cascading threat. In that case, the following dependency chains are produced: The results of this scenario verify that the outcome is consistent with the Medusa cascade risk calculation. We notice that based on the input values, the port authority (along with the customs authority) where the nodes with the higher partial risk for the examined threat with a medium threat value. If however the threat originates near the port authority to its first-order or second order incoming dependencies (i.e., the vehicle transport agent or the ship agent) then the incoming dependency risk for the port authority is still considered medium. This implies that if additional security controls should be implemented, these should be implemented either at the port authority or at its first-order dependencies. As the initiator of the threat event is more distant than the examined destination (the port authority), then the dependency risk for the port authority gradually decreases.
Conclusions and future work
Medusa attempts to cover two main goals: first to be a practical SC risk assessment methodology fully compliant with ISO28001. In addition, Medusa aims to also capture and assess the cascading risks within the SC. Towards this direction, Medusa extends ISO28001 in several ways. First, it defines threat categories and uses them to group specific threat scenarios. Then the threat categories are mapped to specific subsets of the security controls already defined in the security declaration statements. Thus by using the statements provided by all BPs, it is easy to quantify the vulnerability (and eventually likelihood) of each partner for each examined threat scenario. In addition Medusa allows the efficient assessment of cascading risks within the SC by using input data already provided in the previous steps, all potential dependency chains of the SC are assessed and their cascading risk values are then used to prioritise risk mitigation. The Medusa methodology is characterised by its capabilities to:
Capture the opinions, experience and expertise of the BPs engaged in the risk assessment process and produce solid results.
Be resistant against outliers and model deviations by robust estimation of the risks.
Provide more objective risk estimates for the SCS since the opinions of all involved BPs are taken into account.
Provide results which are robust to variations in model parameters.
The Medusa methodology is implemented in the Medusa system offering SCRA services to the BPs of the SCS which is not limited to the borders of one organisation, a single country or region. However further research and collaboration is required in the security of international supply chain services (ISCS) with harmonised implementation of the existing international rules (e.g., ISPS, EC Regulations No 725/2004 , 2005 /65, 2013 /0027, 2015 European Parliament Proposed Directive DATAPROTECT 235 and NIS/2015 . New modelling techniques for visualising and analysing the complex interdependencies of physical and cyber SC assets; innovative risk assessment methods and tools for ISCS identifying and forecasting propagated vulnerabilities and attack trees are emerging research directions. Finally, it should be noted that during the pilot operations of the Medusa project, a large number of port's operators, maritime stakeholders and security/safety experts have been engaged in the process of evaluating the capacity of the Medusa methodology and system (http://medusascsra.cs.unipi.gr/) to meet their objectives. In particular, more than 400 port operators, government officials, leading experts from the maritime, oil and gas sector and IT security professionals trained on the functionality and services of the Medusa system (including representatives from Valenciaport Foundation, Port Authorities of Alicante and Castellon and Piraeus Port Authority) and about 123 of them have used the system to identify and assess the threat scenarios and risks associated with the SCSs in which their organisation participate. R 6.4 Are procedures in place to ensure the integrity of the goods/cargo when the goods/cargo are delivered to another organisation (transportation provider, consolidation centre, intermodal facility, etc.) in the supply chain? R 6.5 Are processes in place to track changes in threat levels along transport routes?
7 Closed cargo transport units (WCO SAFE framework includes a 'seal integrity program' described in the Appendix to Annex 1 that sets out procedures regarding the affixing and verification of high security seals and/or other tamper detection devices. Personnel filling in this form should review that section of the framework). 
